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INTRODUCTION

C
D
T
O
W
I

yberspace has long been characterized as anarchic, a domain devoid of
normative constraint. Indeed, in remarks to the U.N. General Assembly on
his priorities for 2020, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres urged the
international community to “usher in order to the Wild West of cyberspace,”1 an echo of President Barack Obama’s 2015 remark at Stanford University that “[t]he cyber world is sort of the Wild West.”2 Obviously, neither
leader meant that international law did not reach cyber activities, but they
were signaling the uncertainly pervading the precise application of that body
of law in the cyber context.
Scholars and practitioners have been laboring to address that uncertainty.
Most significant in this regard have been the two Tallinn Manual projects
sponsored by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence.3
However, both manuals avoided claims of certainty where reasonable differences of opinion existed as to the interpretation of a rule of law in the cyber
context. Indeed, their major contribution may have been in pointing out
where views diverged, thereby allowing States to focus interpretive efforts
where they were most needed.
States are only now beginning to set forth their views on how international law governs cyberspace. Notable examples are statements by, inter alia,
the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Australia,4 but they are
1. U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to the General Assembly: The Secretary-General’s
Priorities for 2020 (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/202001-22/remarks-general-assembly-priorities-for-2020.
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Cybersecurity and Consumer Summit, Stanford University (Feb. 13, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/remarks-president-cybersecurity-and-consumerprotection-summit.
3. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]; TALLINN
MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N.
Schmitt ed., 2013).
4. Jeremy Wright, Attorney General, United Kingdom, Cyber and International Law in
the 21st Century, Chatham House (May 23, 2018), https://www.chathamhouse.org/
event/cyber-and-international-law-21st-century; MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, REPUBLIC OF
FRANCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO OPERATIONS IN CYBERSPACE (2019),
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/567648/9770527/file/international+
law+applied+to+operations+in+cyberspace.pdf; Letter from the Netherlands Minister of
Foreign Affairs to the President of the House of Representatives on the International Legal
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overshadowed by the number of States that remain reticent to do so. Furthermore, a review of State practice demonstrates that even States targeted
by a hostile cyber operation often refrain from invoking the language of international law when denouncing the attack, when attributing it to a malicious State or non-State actor, or when resorting to cyber or non-cyber
measures in response.5
Numerous explanations have been proffered for the reluctance of States
to invoke international law in relation to hostile cyber operations. One is the
assertion that norms developed in a kinetic or offline context are inadequate
to address the unique features of cyber operations, which can be perpetrated
by proxies, are often designed to spoof the originator, and can cause nonphysical effects that are nevertheless very severe. For instance, the concepts
of use of force and armed attack in the jus ad bellum seem ill-suited when
applied to cyber operations that dramatically disrupt civilian life without
causing physical damage or that target data. In the same vein, international
humanitarian law’s rules on targeting cannot easily be interpreted and applied
in the cyber context in a manner that reasonably balances military necessity
and humanitarian considerations given the integrated nature of many military
and civilian infrastructures.6
The political or operational interests of States that find themselves on
the virtual frontline, either facing hostile operations or launching them, is
Order in Cyberspace, app.: International Law in Cyberspace (July 5, 2019), https://www.
government.nl/documents/parliamentary-documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-international-legal-order-in-cyberspace; GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA, AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL CYBER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY, ANNEX A: SUPPLEMENT TO
AUSTRALIA’S POSITION ON THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO STATE CONDUCT IN CYBERSPACE (2017), https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-relations/international-cyber-engagement-strategy/aices/chapters/annexes.html#Annex-A;
see also 2019 INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT to id., https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-relations/international-cyber-engagement-strategy/aices/chapters/2019_international_law_supplement.html.
See also papers by States submitted to the 2019–2021 Advancing Responsible State
Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security. Group of Government Experts, OFFICE OF DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/disarmament/group-of-governmental-experts/ (last visited July 14, 2020); Open-Ended Working
Group, OFFICE OF DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/disarmament/open-ended-working-group/ (last visited July 14, 2020).
5. Martha Finnemore & Duncan Hollis, Beyond Naming and Shaming: Accusations and International Law in Cybersecurity, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming
2020).
6. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare 3.0: Protecting the Civilian Population during
Cyber Operations, 101 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 333 (2019).
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another common explanation for their hesitancy to invoke international law.7
They may be reluctant to draw attention to a hostile cyber operation out of
embarrassment, because doing so could reveal technical cyber security capabilities and vulnerabilities, or due to concern that it would create unwelcome
domestic pressure to respond. States on both sides of the equation might be
apprehensive about committing to a specific interpretation of an international law rule, such as on where the threshold for a violation of sovereignty
or wrongful use of force lies. And some States certainly believe that a policy
of deterrence unfettered by normative strictures offers a more promising way
to prevent harmful cyber operations than reliance on international law norms
and institutions.
There may be, however, a further explanation for such reluctance—the
lack of a credible attribution mechanism capable of validating the facts underlying State legal claims regarding cyber operations. Such information is
necessary not only to understand what actually happened, and to identify the
culprit, but also to mobilize third-party support for the victim State’s assertions, including through collective attribution of (and response to) the operation. More to the point, as a matter of law, “internationally wrongful acts”
(violations of international law) require both breach of a State’s international
law obligation and attribution of the act (which may consist of either an action or an omission) to a “responsible” State.8
The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility are
generally accepted as restating the customary international law standards for
attribution to States. In the cyber context, the two most likely, albeit not
only, bases for attribution are that an organ of a State, such as the armed
forces, launched the cyber operation that breached the obligation in question,9 or that a non-State actor, like a hacktivist group or a private company,
did so upon the instructions or under the effective control of a State.10 There
are different standards of proof depending on the purpose of the assertion
7. Finnemore & Hollis, supra note 5.
8. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 53 U.N. GAOR Supp.
No. 10, art. 22, at 75–76, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEARBOOK OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 75–76, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1
(Part 2) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility]. For instance, the internationally
wrongful act of violating another State’s sovereignty requires that the cyber operation qualify
as a breach of sovereignty, for instance, because it causes permanent loss of functionality of
the targeted cyberinfrastructure, and establishing that the operation had been conducted by
a foreign State. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 4, at 17–27.
9. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, art. 4.
10. Id. art. 8.
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of unlawfulness,11 but legal rights under international law can only be effectively invoked and relied upon in practice on the basis of an adequate factual
foundation.
The linkage between the need for factual information about those behind
hostile cyber operations and giving effect to the rules of international law
has been the driving force behind initiatives by the Atlantic Council,12 Microsoft,13 RAND,14 and academics in support of an international attribution
mechanism.15 The goal of these initiatives is to promote accountability for
past operations that violate international law and raise deterrence against future ones. A potentially important step towards realizing this vision was the
2019 establishment of the CyberPeace Institute, which is co-sponsored by
the Hewlett Foundation, Mastercard, and Microsoft.16 Among its goals, the
institute intends to perform, facilitate, and coordinate “collective analysis,
research, and investigations of sophisticated cyberattacks” in order to “close
the accountability gap.”17 Yet, to date, no concrete effort is underway to establish a full-fledged international mechanism charged with engaging in technical attribution of hostile cyber operations, and in linking such operations
to States.
It is against this backdrop that we organized an international research
project funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federmann
Cyber Security Research Center of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem to
consider the feasibility of establishing an international attribution mechanism, as well as the usefulness of such a body.18 By international attribution
11. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, at 81–83.
12. JASON HEALEY ET AL., ATLANTIC COUNCIL, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
IN CYBERSPACE: A MULTISTAKEHOLDER APPROACH FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY (2014).
13. SCOTT CHARNEY ET AL., MICROSOFT, FROM ARTICULATION TO IMPLEMENTATION: ENABLING PROGRESS ON CYBERSECURITY NORMS (2016).
14. JOHN S. DAVIS II ET AL., RAND CORPORATION, STATELESS ATTRIBUTION (2017).
15. See, e.g., Elena Chernenko, Oleg Demidov & Fyodor Lukyanov, Increasing International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting Cyber Norms, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/increasing-international-cooperation-cybersecurity-and-adapting-cyber-norms; Milton Mueller et al., Cyber Attribution: Can a New Institution Achieve Transnational Credibility?, CYBER DEFENCE REVIEW, Spring 2019, at 107, 107.
16. Who We Are, CYBERPEACE INSTITUTE, https://cyberpeaceinstitute.org/who-weare (last visited July 14, 2020). In full disclosure, Professor Michael Schmitt is a member of
the CyberPeace Institute Advisory Board.
17. Accountability, CYBER PEACE INSTITUTE, https://cyberpeaceinstitute.org/aboutus/accountability (last visited July 14, 2020).
18. Details about the project and workshops it sponsored can be found on Federmann
Cyber Security Research Center’s website. See Attribution of Cyber Attacks: Technological and
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mechanism, we mean an entity that is multinational and diverse in its makeup, whether composed of private individuals or public officials, with responsibility for identifying the State or non-State actors who have either conducted a hostile cyber operation or are otherwise involved in that operation.
Workshops organized by the project brought together academics and
policymakers, including experts with relevant legal, political, and technological backgrounds, to discuss papers prepared by the project’s researchers on
such topics as standards of proof for attributing cyber operations under the
law of State responsibility, the use of private cybersecurity companies to investigate cyber incidents, investigative models drawn from other technologyintensive fields like weapons control regimes, and the collective attribution
practices of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This process enabled us to identify certain contexts in which
an international attribution mechanism could prove useful and a number of
constituencies that might be interested in turning to it in appropriate cases.
The discussions, which were subject to the Chatham House Rule, have
led us to conclude that, for the time being, States wielding significant cyber
capability have little interest in creating an international attribution mechanism for cyber incidents. Such States appear to be of the view that they can
generate sufficient accountability and deterrence based on their independent
technological capacity, access to expertise and to offensive (active defense)
cyber tools, political clout, security alliances, and other policy tools, such as
sanctions.
At the same time, our discussions suggested that countries with limited
technological capacity and less ability to mobilize international support for
collective attribution are more amenable to the prospect, especially as a tool
for “naming and shaming” States conducting unlawful cyber operations
against private and public infrastructure in their territory. Furthermore, we
are of the view that international or regional organizations that have the ability to facilitate collective sanctions in relation to unlawful cyber operations
directed against member States or their partners, like the EU with its sanctions regime,19 might appreciate in certain situations an official finding of
legal responsibility for a number of political and legal reasons.
Legal Dimensions (CSRCI), https://csrcl.huji.ac.il/event/attributing-cyber-attacks (last visited July 14, 2020); International Accountability Mechanisms: Political and Legal Feasibility (CRCSI),
https://csrcl.huji.ac.il/event/attribution-workshop (last visited July 14, 2020).
19. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019, Concerning Restrictive
Measures against Cyber-Attacks Threatening the Union or its Member States, 2019 O.J. (L
1291) 13 (EC); Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796, Concerning Restrictive Measures against
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This article examines several possible justifications for establishing an
international attribution mechanism and its principal constituencies. Part II
sets forth the general case for international fact-finding mechanisms in international law, particularly when there is a need to rely on scientific and
technological expertise. Part III details the shortcomings of the existing processes for attributing responsibility for hostile cyber operations. Part IV reviews proposals to establish an international attribution mechanism, while
Part V examines the constituency for a new mechanism. Our concluding
thoughts are set forth in Part VI.
II. THE ROLE OF FACT-FINDING MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The linkage between international peace and security and international factfinding has a long pedigree in international law. In the aftermath of the February 1898 sinking of USS Maine in Havana harbor and the ensuing SpanishAmerican War,20 a Permanent Court of Arbitration was created pursuant to
the 1899 Hague (I) Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, a body that continues to operate today.21 The agreement also provided for international commissions of inquiry “to facilitate a solution of
[‘differences of opinion’] by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial
and conscientious investigation.”22 Fyodor Martens, the prominent Russian
diplomat who introduced the commissions of inquiry provisions during the
1899 Peace Conference, described them as establishing a voluntary fact-finding mechanism that could avoid inflammatory disinformation about the
causes of an international dispute while gaining time to resolve the matter.23
Interestingly, the Russian delegation to the 1899 Conference proposed
adding the investigation of questions of responsibility to the duties of the
commissions of inquiry, although Martens himself expressed limited enthu-

Cyber-Attacks Threatening the Union or its Member States, 2019 O.J. (L 1291) 1. For a
summary, see Adam Botek, European Union Establishes a Sanction Regime for Cyber-attacks, CCDCOE, https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/european-union-establishes-a-sanction-regime-for-cyber-attacks/ (last visited July 14, 2020).
20. J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 43–44 (4th ed. 2005).
21. Convention (I) for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 20, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 187 Consol. T.S. 410, as amended, Oct. 18, 1907, 32 Stat. 2199, 205
Consol. T.S. 536.
22. Id. art. 9.
23. THE REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, at 50 (James
Brown Scott ed., 1917).
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siasm for the proposal, noting that it could trespass into the realm of arbitration. He conceded, however, that States were free to conclude special
agreements to that effect.24 Indeed, in 1904, a commission of inquiry established to investigate a maritime incident in the North Sea was authorized to
establish responsibility for the incident and to allocate the degree of blame
of those involved.25
In recent decades, fact-finding and inquiry mechanisms often have been
employed in the field of international human rights law to establish accountability for violations and to facilitate subsequent action by political bodies
entrusted with promoting respect for human rights. The frequent utilization
of ad hoc bodies, such as commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions,26
more permanent bodies with renewable mandates, such as thematic and
country rapporteurs and working groups,27 and international treaty bodies
invested with the power to conduct inquiries,28 reflects the international human rights system’s post-1967 shift from standard-setting to implementation
activities.29
24. Id. at 313.
25. Declaration between the United Kingdom and Russia Relating to the Constitution
of an International Commission of Inquiry on the Subject of the North Sea Incident art. 2,
Nov. 25, 1904, reprinted in HAGUE COURT REPORTS 411 (James Brown Scott ed., 1916). For
a full discussion of this Commission, see Jan Martin Lemnitzer, International Commissions of
Inquiry and the North Sea Incident: A Model for a MH17 Tribunal?, 27 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 923 (2016).
26. For a list of the thirty-one ad hoc bodies established by the U.N. Human Rights
Council, see List of HRC-Mandated Commissions of Inquiries/Fact-Finding Missions & Other Bodies
(As of October 2019), UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, https://www.ohchr.org/
EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/ListHRCMandat.aspx (last visited July 14, 2010).
27. For a list of thematic and country specific mandates created by the U.N. Human
Rights Council, see Country Mandates, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx (last
visited July 14, 2020).
28. For a list of U.N. human rights treaty bodies authorized to conduct inquiries, see
Human Rights Bodies – Complaints Procedures, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/
HRTBPetitions.aspx (last visited July 14, 2020).
29. Frans Viljoen, Fact-Finding by UN Human Rights Complaints Bodies – Analysis and Suggested Reforms, 8 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 49, 54 (2004). It has
also been suggested that human rights fact-finding, unlike traditional fact-finding, aims to
identify and blame those responsible for violations. See Larissa J. van den Herik, An Inquiry
into the Role of Commissions of Inquiry in International Law: Navigating the Tensions between FactFinding and Application of International Law, 13 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
507, 536–37 (2014).
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Fact-finding mechanisms have also been used to support action by political bodies in other fields of international law, such as international civil
aviation law30 and international labor law.31 By contrast, international humanitarian law fact-finding mechanisms, most notably the fact-finding commission provided for in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions,32 have not been operationalized because of limited interest in
resorting to them by States involved in armed conflicts.33
In many cases where fact-finding mechanisms have been established and
utilized, the resort to independent experts links, directly or indirectly, to the
goal of advancing legal and political accountability.34 By elucidating facts
30. See, e.g., John T. Phelps II, Aerial Intrusions by Civil and Military Aircraft in Time of Peace,
107 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 255, 265 (1985).
31. See, e.g., DAVID TAJGMAN & KAREN CURTIS, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A USER’S
GUIDE – STANDARDS, PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION 72 (2000).
32. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 90, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3; see also Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 52, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 132, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 149, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
33. Heike Spieker, International (Humanitarian) Fact-Finding Commission, in THE MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 505, 513-514 (Frauke
Lachenmann & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2017); Robert Heinsch, The Future of the International
Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission: A Possibly to Overcome the Weakness of IHL Compliance
Mechanism, in THE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 79, 81–82
(Dražan Djukić & Niccolò Pons eds., 2018); van den Herik, supra note 29, at 529–31.
34. Larissa J. van den Herick & Catherine Harwood, Commissions of Inquiry and the Charm
of International Criminal Law: Between Transactional and Authoritative Approaches, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING 233, 238–39 (Philip Alston & Sarah
Knuckey eds., 2016); see also U.N. Human Rights Council Res. S-17/1, Situation of Human
Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/1 (Nov. 23, 2011)
Decides to dispatch urgently an independent international commission of inquiry, to be
appointed by the President of the Human Rights Council, to investigate all alleged violations
of international human rights law since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic, to establish
the facts and circumstances that may amount to such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a view to ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, are held
accountable.

U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 28/30, Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building to
Improve Human Rights in Libya, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/28/30 (Apr. 7, 2015)
(“Requests the High Commissioner urgently to dispatch a mission to investigate violations
and abuses of international human rights law committed in Libya since the beginning of
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through a process of investigation that is legitimate and credible, States that
violate international law are less able to avoid legal responsibility by denying
the underlying facts or their involvement in the situation. Furthermore, publicizing facts with self-evident legal or moral implications can “shame” State
and non-State actors, as well as alert them and other actors to the possibility
of being held accountable should they continue to engage in unlawful conduct.35 Determining the facts can also provide a degree of satisfaction for
victims.36 And of course, establishing the factual record can enable followup action to assign legal or political responsibility and the taking of appropriate measures against those responsible.37 In other words, fact-finding fosters accountability by exposing facts and facilitating accountability-generating processes, thereby also enhancing deterrence. In doing so, fact-finding
mechanisms contribute to the rule of law in international relations.38
A specific area of international relations in which fact-finding mechanisms have proven effective is arms control. Fact-finding in this field, especially with respect to the development, use, and proliferation of unconventional weapons, is especially relevant to cyber activity because States tend to
operate behind a shroud of national security secrecy and investigations require sophisticated scientific expertise to collect and analyze data. Examples
include the technical verification mechanisms developed under the auspices
2014, and to establish the facts and circumstances of such abuses and violations with a view
to avoiding impunity and ensuring full accountability.”); U.N. Human Rights Council Res.
22/13, Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶ 5, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/RES/22/13 (Apr. 9, 2013)
Further decides that the commission of inquiry will investigate the systematic, widespread
and grave violations of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as outlined in paragraph 31 of the report of the Special Rapporteur, including the violation of the
right to food, the violations associated with prison camps, torture and inhuman treatment,
arbitrary detention, discrimination, violations of freedom of expression, violations of the
right to life, violations of freedom of movement, and enforced disappearances, including in
the form of abductions of nationals of other States, with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular where these violations may amount to crimes against humanity.

35. van den Herick & Harwood, supra note 34, 237–38.
36. Cecilie Hellestveit, International Fact-Finding Mechanisms: Lighting Candles or Cursing
Darkness?, in PROMOTING PEACE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 368, 369 (Cecilia
Marcela Bailliet & Kjetil Mujezinovic Larsen eds., 2015).
37. Michael A. Becker & Sarah Nouwen, International Commissions of Inquiry: What Difference Do They Make? Taking an Empirical Approach, 30 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 819, 834 (2019). This is not always the case, for some fact-finding missions do
not result in follow-up. See Romana Schweiger, Late Justice for Burundi, 55 INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 653, 656 n.22 and accompanying text (2006).
38. Dan Saxon, Purpose and Legitimacy in International Fact-Finding Bodies, in QUALITY CONTROL IN FACT-FINDING 211, 219 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2013).
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of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (through an Additional
Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement),39 the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (through the inspection
activity of the Technical Secretariat),40 and the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) (through the verification and monitoring activities of the
Technical Secretariat).41
Verification mechanisms typically have ongoing monitoring responsibilities, such as routine inspections,42 and the collection of data from monitoring stations43 and on-site instruments.44 They can also respond to specific
concerns about compliance, as with “challenge inspections” under the
Chemical Weapons Convention,45 investigation of alleged use of chemical
weapons pursuant to the U.N. Secretary-General Mechanism,46 inspections
upon request by a State party to clarify whether another State has conducted
a nuclear test in violation of the CTBT,47 and special inspections undertaken

39. International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards,
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/540.Corr (Sept. 1997).
40. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. VIII, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S
45 [hereinafter CWC]; id., Verification Annex.
41. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Sept. 10, 1996, arts. II, IV, 35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1439 (not yet in force) [hereinafter CTBT]; id, Protocol [hereinafter CTBT Protocol].
42. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency art. XII(6), Oct. 23, 1956,
276 U.N.T.S 3.
43. CTBT Protocol, supra note 41, pt. I.
44. CWC, supra note 40, Verification Annex, pt. III(B)(10).
45. Id. art. X.
46. G.A. Res. 42/37C, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons (Nov. 30,
1987). The Secretary-General resorted to this mechanism in 2013 in connection with allegations that chemical weapons were used in Syria. The inspections, conducted by experts
from the OPCW and World Health Organization, were authorized only to determine
whether chemical weapons were used, without determining who used them. David Martin, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Hollow Idealism or Capable Mechanism? The Syrian Intervention as a Test Case, 37 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
REVIEW 31, 50 (2015).
47. CTBT, supra note 41, art. IV(D). See in particular id. ¶ 35 (“The sole Purpose of an
on-site inspection shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other
nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I and, to the extent possible,
to gather any facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator.”).
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by the IAEA.48 In such cases, information collected and analyzed by verification mechanisms can include, for instance, documents, technical data,
samples, and interviews.49
In that verification mechanisms have the potential to embarrass violators50 and set international legal and political processes of condemnation and
sanction in motion,51 they are integral to the stability of arms control regimes.
Such mechanisms not only deter would-be violators by enhancing the likelihood of detection,52 but also provide a means for States to refute unfounded
allegations.
The recent resort by the United Kingdom to the OPCW inspection machinery in connection with the Salisbury incident illustrates how a technical
fact-finding apparatus can be used to shame a violating State and support
accountability. It also casts new light on some of the principled arguments
discussed below, which question the necessity of developing an international
accountability mechanism in the field of cyber security.
On March 4, 2018, two Russian nationals were poisoned in Salisbury
through exposure to a rare nerve agent. Eight days later, U.K. Prime Minister
Theresa May announced in the House of Commons that the poison was a
48. See, e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. 73, at 17, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/214 (Dec. 13, 1974); see
also Wolfgang Fischer & Gotthard Stein, On-Site Inspections: Experiences from Nuclear Safeguarding, 3 DISARMAMENT FORUM 45, 49–50 (1999).
49. See, e.g., CTBT Protocol, supra note 41, at IV(D), ¶35; CWC, supra note 40, Verification Annex, pt. XI(D), at 25–26
The final report shall summarize the factual findings of the inspection, particularly with
regard to the alleged use cited in the request. . . . If the inspection team collects through,
inter alia, identification of any impurities or other substances during laboratory analysis of
samples taken, any information in the course of its investigation that might serve to identify
the origin of any chemical weapons used, that information shall be included in the report.

But see Martin, supra note 46, at 50.
50. TREVOR FINDLAY, PROLIFERATION ALERT! THE IAEA AND NON-COMPLIANCE
REPORTING 73 (2015) (discussing the special inspection of the Republic of Korea).
51. Thilo Marauhn, Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding, in THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 297, 325 (Walter Krutzsch, Eric Myjer & Ralf Trapp
eds., 2014); David Cortright, Linda Gerber & George A. Lopez, Implementing Targeted Sanctions: The Role of International Agencies and Regional Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: BETWEEN WARS AND WORDS 144, 146 (Peter Wallensteen & Carina Staibano eds.,
2005).
52. Jenifer Mackby, Nonproliferation Verification and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 34 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 697, 707 (2011); SARAH J. DIEHL & JAMES CLAY
MOLTZ, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NON-PROLIFERATION 50 (2002).
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military-grade nerve agent of a type developed by Russia known as “Novichok.”53 The United Kingdom then took retaliatory measures against Russia, including the expulsion of twenty-three Russian diplomats.54 The United
Kingdom also looked to the OPCW for help in investigating the incident, a
decision welcomed by the EU.55 Following a technical assistance visit, the
organization released a public summary of its findings on April 12.56 The full
confidential report, which reportedly corroborated the U.K. law enforcement findings concerning the nerve agent, was circulated to OPCW member
States.57 On July 13, the United Kingdom asked again for OPCW assistance
in investigating a poisoning incident, this time in Amesbury; the resulting
report matched the Amesbury toxic chemicals with those found in Salisbury.58
A central issue for the purposes of this article is the United Kingdom’s
motivation in seeking OPCW assistance. That the OPCW merely confirmed
the United Kingdom’s findings demonstrates that the organization was not
filling a capability gap. Indeed, on March 27, even before completion of the
OPCW investigation, twenty of the United Kingdom’s Western partners
moved to expel Russian diplomats (more than one hundred in total) based

53. Prime Minister Theresa May, Oral Statement to Parliament: PM Commons Statement on Salisbury Incident: 12 March 2018 (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-commons-statement-on-salisbury-incident-12-march-2018.
54. Russian Spy: UK to Expel 23 Russian Diplomats, BBC (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-43402506.
55. Press Release, Council of the European Union, Statement by the Foreign Affairs
Council on the Salisbury Attack (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
press/press-releases/2018/03/19/statement-by-the-foreign-affairs-council-on-the-salisbury-attack/.
56. Technical Secretariat, OPCW, Note by the Technical Secretariat: Summary of the Report on
Activities Carried Out in Support of a Request for Technical Assistance by the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland (Technical Assistance Visit TAV/02/18), S/1612/2018, Apr. 12,
2018, https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2018/en/s-16122018_e_.pdf.
57. Chemical Watchdog Confirms UK Findings on Salisbury Nerve Agent, UN NEWS (Apr. 18,
2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/04/1007642.
58. Technical Secretariat, OPCW, Note by the Technical Secretariat: Summary of the Report on
Activities Carried Out in Support of a Request for Technical Assistance by the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland (Technical Assistance Visit TAV/03/18 and TAV/03B/18 “Amesbury Incident”), S/1671/2018, Sept. 4, 2018, https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2018/09/s-1671-2018%28e%29.pdf.
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on those findings.59 Rather, it appears the United Kingdom leveraged the
organization to enhance the credibility of its findings regarding the poison,
thereby enabling it and other States to name, blame, and shame Russia more
effectively.60
Similarly, in a speech at the OPCW on June 26, 2018, U.K. Foreign Minister Boris Johnson stressed the need to further enhance accountability by
authorizing the Technical Secretariat to attribute responsibility for chemical
attacks in the context of Syria.
Our aim . . . is to reinforce the OPCW as an institution. Last November,
the Security Council was prevented from renewing the Joint Investigative
Mechanism, meaning that no international body is working to attribute responsibility for chemical weapons attacks in Syria. At present, the OPCW’s
experts will say where and when an attack happened, but not who was responsible. If we are serious about upholding the ban on chemical weapons,
that gap must be filled. Attributing responsibility for an attack is clearly part
of the OPCW’s technical remit, requiring no change to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Director General has confirmed that the OPCW is
able and willing to perform this essential task.61

In a decision adopted by the Conference of State Parties the next day, authorization was granted. Reaffirming that “those responsible for the use of
chemical weapons should be held accountable,” the Conference decided
that:
59. Julian Borger, Patrick Wintour & Heather Stewart, Western Allies Expel Scores of Russian Diplomats over Skripal Attack, GUARDIAN, Mar. 27, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/26/four-eu-states-set-to-expel-russian-diplomats-over-skripal-attack.
60. Interestingly enough, on March 13, 2018, the Russians called for the United Kingdom to involve the OPCW and to request their technical assistance in response to accusations by the United Kingdom, on the basis that they were not involved in the Salisbury
incident. Executive Council, OPCW, Russian Federation: Statement by H.E. Ambassador A. V.
Shulgin Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the OPCW at the Eighty-Seventh Session
of the Executive Council (On the Chemical Incident in Salisbury), EC-87/NAT.9, Mar. 13, 2018,
https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/EC/87/en/ec87nat09_e_.pdf.
61. Boris Johnson, U.K. Foreign Secretary, Foreign Secretary’s Speech at the OPCW
Special Conference of the States Parties (June 26, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretarys-speech-at-the-opcw-special-conference-of-the-statesparties. For criticism of the initiative, see Oliver Meier & Ralf Trapp, Playing Politics with Chemical Weapons? The UK’s Initiative on Chemical Weapons Accountability, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS (June 20, 2018), https://thebulletin.org/2018/06/playing-politics-with-chemical-weapons-the-uks-initiative-on-chemical-weapons-accountability/.
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the Director-General, if requested by a State Party investigating a possible
chemical weapons use on its territory, can provide technical expertise to
identify those who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise
involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, and further decide[d] that, in
this context, the Director-General may enlist support as appropriate from
outside experts with relevant qualifications and professional experience,
and invites the Director-General to submit to the Conference at its next
regular session specific proposals to establish such independent, impartial,
expert arrangements.62

The day after the Conference acted, the EU Council expressed support for
the implementation of the decision and for the development of a chemical
weapons sanctions regime.63 Such a regime subsequently was characterized
by the United Kingdom as an effective means of holding individuals and
entities responsible for the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.64 Further Council support for “international initiatives aimed at tackling the threat
of chemical weapons” came in October with the implementation of a sanctions regime.65
To summarize, flagrant violations of international law norms prohibiting
the employment of chemical weapons initiated an effort to impose accountability through the use of an international fact-finding mechanism and by
authorizing it to attribute legal responsibility. These moves were accompanied by ad hoc sanctions against suspected perpetrators and the development
of a standing sanctions mechanism. The question is whether a similar dynamic involving international fact-finding, attribution of international responsibility, and the imposition of collective sanctions would be viable in

62. Conference of the States Parties, OPCW, Decision: Addressing the Threat from Chemical
Weapons Use, at 4, ¶ 20, C-SS-4/DEC.3, June 27, 2018, https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/CSP/C-SS-4/en/css4dec3_e_.doc.pdf.
63. Press Release, European Council, European Council Conclusions, 28 June 2018
(June 29, 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/
20180628-euco-conclusions-final/.
64. Press Release, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom, Foreign Secretary Urges EU to Press Ahead with Listings Under New Chemical Weapons Sanctions
Regime (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-urgeseu-to-press-ahead-with-listings-under-new-chemical-weapons-sanctions-regime. The statement also alluded to the need for a cyber-related sanctions regime.
65. Council Decision 2018/1544 of 15 October 2018, Concerning Restrictive Measures
against the Proliferation and Use of Chemical Weapons, 2018 O.J. (L 259) 25.
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other fields of activity involving national security that pose technical attribution challenges and face denials by responsible States, specifically cyber operations.
III.

THE PRESENT STATE OF CYBER ATTRIBUTION

States that have fallen victim to hostile cyber operations are increasingly willing to attribute them to other States.66 Moreover, attribution is often collective in the sense that it involves the issuance of a common statement or endorsement of another State’s assertion of responsibility. The collective attributions of the WannaCry67 and NotPetya68 cyber operations, as well as
hostile cyber operations targeting the OPCW69 and Georgia,70 are illustrative
of this developing practice.

66. For a survey of eleven prominent cyber operations that occurred between 2012 and
2017 in which State involvement was suspected, see Dan Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule
Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice, 112 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 583, 655–57 (2018). According to the survey, five
cases did not result in an official statement by the victim State pointing the finger at the
suspected attacking State, and in one case (the attack on the Bundestag) the statements made
were somewhat uncertain. Furthermore, the survey suggests an increase in the rate of attributions during the surveyed period. See id.; see also Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Law & Politics
of Cyberattack Attribution, 67 UCLA LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2020) (including under the
definition of attribution not only official statements, but also indictments and technical
alerts).
67. Press Briefing, The White House, The Attribution of the WannaCry Malware Attack to North Korea (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-on-the-attribution-of-the-wannacry-malware-attack-to-north-korea121917/ (attributing the malware attack to North Korea and indicating that the United
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan join the statement).
68. Stilgherrian, Blaming Russia for NotPetya was Coordinated Diplomatic Action, ZDNET
(Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.zdnet.com/article/blaming-russia-for-notpetya-was-coordinated-diplomatic-action/ (discussing the coordination of collective attribution by the
United Kingdom, United States, Denmark, Lithuania, Estonia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Latvia, Sweden, and Finland).
69. Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service Disrupts Russian Cyber Operation Targeting OPCW, GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2018/10/04/netherlands-defence-intelligence-and-security-servicedisrupts-russian-cyber-operation-targeting-opcw (noting that the attribution is supported by
the United Kingdom and that the United States has opened a criminal investigation against
the implicated GRU officers).
70. Przemyslaw Roguski, Russian Cyber Attacks against Georgia, Public Attributions and Sovereignty in Cyberspace, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69019/
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There has also been some progress in developing a structure for collective attribution. Of particular note, the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox,71
which was adopted in 2017, provides for a joint EU diplomatic response to
hostile cyber operations. It is premised on the belief that “clearly signaling
the likely consequences of a joint EU diplomatic response to . . . malicious
cyber activities influences the behavior of potential aggressors in cyberspace
thus reinforcing the security of the EU and its Member States.”72 As part of
the broader EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, the EU established a cyber-related sanctions regime in 2019 that provides for the imposition of “targeted
restrictive measures” on natural and legal persons.73 Both the Toolbox and
the sanctions regime clarify, however, that a joint diplomatic response or the
imposition of sanctions should be distinguished from a decision to attribute
responsibility to a foreign State, which is described as “a sovereign political
decision taken on a case-by-case basis,”74 one to be “based on all-source intelligence and . . . in accordance with [the] international law of State responsibility.”75
Other States and international and regional organizations are also crafting collective responses to hostile cyber operations. In 2018, the United
States announced an International Cyber Deterrence Initiative aimed at
building a coalition of like-minded States that can act “in concert” to impose
“consequences” on adversaries, so as to ensure that they “understand the
consequences of their malicious cyber behavior.”76 The 2018 U.S. National
Cyber Strategy also envisions intelligence sharing with key partners to identify hostile State and non-State cyber activities.77 The same year, NATO leaders adopted the Brussels Summit Declaration, which confirmed that
russian-cyber-attacks-against-georgia-public-attributions-and-sovereignty-in-cyberspace/
(noting that more than twenty countries attributed the attacks to Russia).
71. General Secretariat of the Council, Council of the European Union, Draft Council
Conclusions on a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities (“Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox”) – Adoption, 9916/17, June 7, 2017 [hereinafter Cyber
Diplomacy Toolbox].
72. Id., annex, at 5, ¶ 4.
73. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019, Concerning Restrictive
Measures against Cyber-Attacks Threatening the Union or its Member States, 2019 O.J. (L
129) 13 (EC); Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, supra note 71.
74. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797, pmbl., ¶ 9.
75. See Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, supra note 71, annex, at 5, ¶ 4.
76. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL CYBER STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 21 (2018).
77. See id. The Strategy also stipulates that the U.S. intelligence community should “continue to lead the world in the use of all-source cyber intelligence to drive the identification
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NATO’s collective defense policies applied to cyberspace and called on its
members to consider responding to malicious cyber activity in a coordinated
manner.78
It should be noted that attribution is seldom accompanied in practice by
the release of the underlying evidence, despite broad international support
for the principle that States should, where possible, provide the basis for that
attribution. For instance, the 2015 U.N. Group of Governmental Experts
on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in
the Context of International Security, which included all permanent members of the Security Council and whose consensus report was endorsed by
the General Assembly, noted that “accusations of organizing and implementing wrongful acts brought against States should be substantiated.”79
Still, the responsibility to release the evidence underlying attribution was
styled as a voluntary, non-binding norm of responsible State behavior, not
as a legal obligation.
Indeed, key States, such as the United States and the United Kingdom,
have taken the position that there is no legal duty to accompany public acts

and attribution of malicious cyber activity that threatens United States national interests.”
Id.
78. Press Release, NATO, Brussels Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State
and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11–
12 July 2018, Press Release (2018) 074 (July 11, 2018) (last updated Aug. 30, 2018),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm
Cyber defense is part of NATO’s core task of collective defense. We must be able to operate
as effectively in cyberspace as we do in the air, on land, and at sea to strengthen and support
the Alliance’s overall deterrence and defense posture. We therefore continue to implement
cyberspace as a domain of operations. . . . We continue to work together to develop
measures which would enable us to impose costs on those who harm us. Individual Allies
may consider, when appropriate, attributing malicious cyber activity and responding in a
coordinated manner, recognizing attribution is a sovereign national prerogative. We are determined to deliver strong national cyber defenses through full implementation of the Cyber
Defence Pledge, which is central to enhancing cyber resilience and raising the costs of a
cyber-attack. We reaffirm our commitment to act in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and human rights law, as applicable.

79. Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (2015), transmitted by Letter Dated 22 July 2015 from the Secretary-General Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolution 68/243 (2014) Addressed to the General Assembly, ¶ 28(f), U.N. Doc.
A/70/174 (July 22, 2015); G.A. Res. 70/237 (Dec. 30, 2015) (endorsing the report).
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of attribution with disclosure of any underlying evidence.80 Although there
are various reasons for the reluctance to commit to releasing evidence, the
most commonly cited is that such a practice can risk revealing intelligence
sources and methods and cyber capabilities. Yet, absent supporting evidence,
the credibility of public attribution is open to challenge. Likewise, collective
attribution is less likely when intelligence on an incident is not shared.
Evidentiary issues might also hamper regional mechanisms for cyberrelated sanctions. For example, the EU cyber-related sanctions regime is
based on a list of natural or legal persons responsible for hostile cyber operations. Inclusion on the list by the Council requires the proposal of a member
State or the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
Although those targeted by restrictive measures may submit observations
leading to reevaluation, the sanctions regime neither specifies the requisite
evidentiary threshold for inclusion, nor mandates the sharing of the underlying intelligence with other member States.81
It is worth noting that some commentators have expressed doubt as to
the effectiveness of recent collective attribution statements, noting the limited number of States involved, a frequent lack of transparency surrounding
the process of attribution, the failure to identify specific international law
obligations that the operations breached, and the lack of political will in following up with the imposition of sanctions and other responses against the
responsible State.82 Arguably, these shortcomings hinder the development of
substantive law in the field of cyber security, since they provide few indications of those cyber operations that States consider unlawful—information
that is essential in both the interpretation of existing legal rules in the cyber
context and the crystallization of new rules of customary international law.83

80. Brian J. Egan, International Law and Stability in Cyberspace, 35 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 169, 177 (2017); Wright, supra note 4; see also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0,
supra note 3, at 83.
81. Such evidentiary standards must meet, however, the requirements set by the Court
of Justice of the European Union for application of individual sanctions. See, e.g., Case
C-176/13 P, Council v. Bank Mellat, ¶127, EU:C:2016:96 (Fifth Chamber) (E.C.J.).
82. See Anushka Kaushik, Public Attribution and Its Scope and Efficacy as a Policy Tool in
Cyberspace, OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION (ORF) (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/public-attribution-and-its-scope-and-efficacy-as-a-policy-tool-incyberspace-56826/; see also Roguski, supra note 70.
83. Eichensehr, supra note 66, at 30; Finnemore & Hollis, supra note 5, at 12.
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PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL ATTRIBUTION MECHANISMS

Against this backdrop, there have been numerous calls for the establishment
of an international attribution mechanism that would foster public confidence in the attribution claims of national security agencies and private cyber
security companies. Although such public and private bodies have considerable professional expertise, their work tends to lack transparency,84 and their
governmental affiliation or commercial interests sometimes render their
claims suspect.85
An independent international mechanism could lend credibility to attribution in the cyber realm, thereby limiting the ability of responsible States to
deny involvement and facilitating collective attribution and response. Like
the OPCW Technical Secretariat, such a mechanism could prove useful for
State and non-State actors in certain situations.86 To be sure, such a mechanism should complement, not replace, existing attribution mechanisms and
practices. Optimally, it should find ways to harness the evidence gathering
and analytical wherewithal of State agencies, and the technical expertise resident in the public and private cyber security sectors.
Several initiatives aimed at promoting an international attribution mechanism have been launched in recent years. In 2014, the Atlantic Council, a
Washington, D.C.-based think tank, proposed the establishment of a Multilateral Cyber Adjudication and Attribution Council (MCAAC).87 The
MCAAC would serve as an inter-State body entrusted with investigating
cyber incidents with a view to attributing responsibility to States when appropriate. It could then issue recommendations for de-escalation or refer the
matter to other political or adjudicative bodies. The Atlantic Council’s proposal envisioned the gradual development of such a mechanism as ad hoc
coalitions of States undertook joint investigations of hostile cyber operations, sometimes in collaboration with private actors.

84. Florian J. Egloff & Andreas Wenger, Public Attribution of Cyber Incidents, 244 CSS
ANALYSES IN SECURITY POLICY, no. 2, May 2019, at 1, 1.
85. Sasha Romanosky & Benjamin Boudreaux, Private Sector Attribution of Cyber Incidents:
Benefits and Risks to the U.S. Government 20 (RAND Working Paper WR-1267-OSD, 2019).
86. One concern raised in this context by Eichensehr is the proliferation of attributions.
Eichensehr, supra note 66. Still, creating a new centralized attribution institution may, over
time, limit reliance on decentralized and multiple attribution bodies.
87. JASON HEALEY ET AL., ATLANTIC COUNCIL, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
IN CYBERSPACE: A MULTISTAKEHOLDER APPROACH FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY 10–12
(2014).
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In 2016, Microsoft published a proposal for an attribution premised on
the investigation of incidents by international experts comprising a publicprivate organization.88 The organization would conduct a technical investigation of certain operations that fell within its purview and report its findings, including evidence of attribution. Only in certain cases would the findings be published publicly. The proposal envisioned the mechanism as also
offering a form of peer review of attribution claims made by other public or
private entities.
The following year, the RAND Corporation proposed a Stateless attribution mechanism consisting of a consortium of private experts specializing
in cyber technology and policy that would, on a discretionary basis, investigate and attribute incidents, as well as provide analysis concerning the severity of the incident and the sophistication of the operation. While the consortium would not be involved in follow-up action, other stakeholders might
use its findings for that purpose.89
Eventually, in 2019, Microsoft joined forces with Mastercard and the
Hewlett Foundation to establish the CyberPeace Institute.90 The Institute’s
mandate includes promoting accountability in cyberspace by facilitating collaborative research into the behavior of those launching hostile cyber operations and ways to fend off such operations, and through publishing information on the techniques, practices, and effects of attack tools. In other
words, it is less an attribution mechanism than an entity producing information that can help other entities effectively attribute.
With the exception of the CyberPeace Institute, which has been established, neither these nor other initiatives91 have gained much momentum.
Based on discussions during the Federmann Cyber Security Research Center’s workshops with legal, policy, and technical experts, diplomats and other
State officials, academics, and industry executives, several tentative reasons
for this lack of progress can be identified.
To begin with, and perhaps most significantly, some major State actors
in the field of cyber security appear uninterested in developing an international attribution mechanism, largely out of a sense that the mechanism
88. See CHARNEY ET AL., supra note 13.
89. JOHN S. DAVID II ET AL., STATELESS ATTRIBUTION: TOWARD INTERNATIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY IN CYBERSPACE (2017).
90. See supra note 15.
91. See, e.g., SERGE DROZ & DANIEL STAUFFACHER, ICT FOR PEACE FOUNDATION,
TRUST AND ATTRIBUTION IN CYBERSPACE: A PROPOSAL FOR AN INDEPENDENT NETWORK OF ORGANISATIONS ENGAGING IN ATTRIBUTION PEER-REVIEW (2018).
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would be redundant. After all, powerful and technologically savvy States
have developed processes for technical attribution that rely upon their own
technical forensic capacity, as well as their intelligence assets, especially signals intelligence and human intelligence. When required, they collaborate
with their partners, some of whom also field impressive capabilities to perform attribution; occasionally, they even turn to private cyber security companies to provide specialized expertise. Once such States can attribute, they
have the offensive tools and the political and economic clout to respond
meaningfully to hostile cyber operations, either alone or in collaboration with
other States.
Moreover, some States appear skeptical about the very push for legal
accountability. Arguably, the proposed mechanism would help to clarify the
law applicable to cyber operations, thereby limiting the operational flexibility
that results from legal ambiguity. In the view of skeptical States, legal clarity
constrains the cyber operations of “rule of law” States, but proves ineffective
in limiting operations by adversaries that do not share that commitment to
the rule of law. Viewing international law as asymmetrically disadvantageous,
these States would prefer to rely on self-help, like robust cyber defenses,
offensive tools, and credible warnings, rather than international law, to safeguard their cyberspace.92 They fear that referral of incidents to an international attribution mechanism might over time deprive them of the discretion
ambiguity offers in terms of attribution and response options.93
Some workshop participants also suggested the initiatives have a number
of shortcomings that have impeded acceptance. For instance, they opined
that the Atlantic Council proposal is short on detail and that a few of its
features—especially vis-à-vis attribution follow-up—could be regarded as
overly ambitious. Its inter-State aspects also pose a risk of politicization.94
The Microsoft proposal is likewise lacking in detail. Further, in that it proffered a hybrid institution, States may have been apprehensive about sharing
the allocation of State responsibility with non-State actors. The fact that the
proposal was put forward by a powerful global commercial entity also generated some skepticism, fair or not, as to Microsoft’s motives. The RAND
proposal is more detailed but envisages a Stateless mechanism over whose

92. See Michael N. Schmitt, Grey Zones in the International Law of Cyberspace, 42 YALE
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ONLINE 1 (2017).
93. See Herbert Lin, Attribution of Malicious Cyber Incidents: From Soup to Nuts, 70 JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 75 (2017).
94. See, e.g., Mueller et al., supra note 15, at 117.
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configuration, mandate, and modus operandi States would have limited influence. This arrangement is unlikely to appeal to States, especially when comparable investigative services are available from private companies.
Finally, numerous participants were of the view that the case for an international attribution mechanism would have been strengthened had the
initiatives more directly identified the specific constituencies likely to be effectively served and the contexts in which the proposals would prove most
useful. In other words, the proposals could be characterized as overbroad in
the sense that they called for a major restructuring of cyber attribution and
the underlying concept of accountability. Thus, some participants argued
that a more sophisticated approach would have been to associate the proposed mechanism with specific needs—a need to increase global capacity to
make credible attribution claims, a need to encourage collective attributions,
and a need to support multilateral follow-up efforts.
V.

THE WAY FORWARD

Effective application of international law to any domain of international relations hinges on the interaction between legal norms, fact-finding processes
that identify violations and attribute responsibility to a State or non-State
actor, and follow-up measures, which can include shaming, making claims in
diplomatic or adjudicative fora, and imposing sanctions, including countermeasures.95 The legitimacy of each link in the chain is premised on the legitimacy of the preceding links; thus, the legitimacy of accusations and responses depends on the legitimacy of the underlying legal rules and attribution process.96 Specifically, the legitimacy of the attribution process undergirds the ability of an accuser to convince relevant target audiences, including
third States that might join collective attribution statements or support multilateral sanctions.97
As explained above, fact-finding provides a basis for legal and political
claims. Thus, fact-finding mechanisms are especially useful in fields where
95. On countermeasures under the law of State responsibility, see Articles on State
Responsibility, supra note 8, art. 22, at 75–76; see also Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold”
Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law, 54 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 697 (2014).
96. Egloff & Wenger, supra note 84, at 2.
97. Sven Herpig & Thomas Reinhold, Spotting the Bear: Credible Attribution and Russian
Operations in Cyberspace, in HACKS, LEAKS AND DISRUPTIONS RUSSIAN CYBER STRATEGIES
33, 40 (Nicu Popescu & Stanislav Secrieru eds., 2018).
218

An International Attribution Mechanism

Vol. 96

legal compliance is chronically deficient, such as human rights law, where
there is a special need to further legitimize norm-implementation efforts and
increase deterrence, or where unique technical challenges present themselves, as in the case of unconventional weapons. Indeed, the use of the
OPCW’s technical facilities in connection with the Salisbury incident illustrates the benefits of fact-finding in cases requiring complex scientific analysis, as well as the growing interest of States in internationalizing attribution
processes.
Moving forward, we maintain that the goal of creating an international
attribution mechanism remains viable and that such an entity would prove
valuable, albeit primarily in three contexts. First, an international attribution
mechanism could prove useful for States with a limited independent capacity
to effectively generate accountability. This includes States that, on the one
hand, are sufficiently advanced technologically so as to render them highly
vulnerable to hostile cyber operations, but, on the other hand, lack the technological capability to conduct their own forensic investigations98 and access
to high-quality intelligence that can support attribution to a State actor.99 In
this context, an international attribution mechanism could help level the
playing field.
Furthermore, small and mid-size States often lack the diplomatic, economic, technical, or military means to effectively respond, when appropriate,
to hostile cyber operations,100 thereby making them dependent on their ability to mobilize other States to support them. Yet, relying on other States or
private cybersecurity companies for attribution assistance risks having the
information provided dismissed as politically biased or profit driven. As a
result, it might not generate the level of legitimacy needed to mobilize third
States.
An international attribution mechanism could prove especially useful in
this regard. A properly crafted mechanism would be more likely to be per-

98. Eichensehr, supra note 66, at 57–58.
99. KARINE BANNELIER & THÉODORE CHRISTAKIS, CYBER-ATTACKS – PREVENTION-REACTIONS: THE ROLE OF STATES AND PRIVATE ACTORS 45 (2017). But see Jason
Rivera, Achieving Cyberdeterrence and the Ability of Small States to Hold Large States at Risk, in
ARCHITECTURES IN CYBERSPACE 7, 14–15 (M. Maybaum, A. M. Osula & L. Lindström eds.,
2015) (claiming that technical attribution suffices to demand some response from the territorial State).
100. Joe Burton, Small States and Cyber Security: The Case of New Zealand, 65 POLITICAL
SCIENCE 216, 224 (2013).
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ceived as independent, impartial, and professionally reliable. Its factual conclusions would presumably enjoy significant traction, which would enhance
the victim State’s ability to generate assistance in imposing accountability.
Second, the creation of an international attribution mechanism would
signal the growing interest of States in collective attribution, as broad condemnation and multilateral responses are more likely to promote accountability than the reactions of a single State. Collective attribution is most effective when there is a high level of confidence in the initial attribution determination. Such confidence can derive from close relations among relevant
States, such as ongoing cooperation between their intelligence agencies, or
through legitimacy-enhancing measures, like transparency.
But in our estimation, an international attribution mechanism would be
especially likely to foster collective attribution because of the legitimacy it
would presumably enjoy.101 In particular, a credible attribution process would
empower States supportive of the rule of law in international relations to
take a principled stand beside the victim State.102 The same logic that led to
the integration of fact-finding mechanisms in the realm of human rights law
to publicly name and shame human rights violators and, in certain cases, to
mobilize third States to sanction them applies mutatis mutandis here.
Third, an international attribution mechanism could play an important
role in connection with the operation of cyber-related sanction regimes, such
as that of the EU. Such regimes rely upon trust in individual attribution determinations by member States. However, since they involve sanctions on
natural or legal actors that may be associated with foreign States, the smooth
operation of the regime generally requires a higher level of confidence than
might otherwise be the case with collective attribution.
An independent professional mechanism could offer verification of individual attribution claims, assuaging the concerns of States about the reliability of the attribution determinations upon which they are being asked to
take action. Moreover, since cyber-related sanction regimes like the EU’s
have implications under the domestic law of the member States, such as the
freezing of assets and travel restrictions, domestic courts may examine the
evidence underlying the sanction decision or seek credible assurance that the
fact-finding process was independent, fair, and provided those involved an

101. Cf. TIMOTHY O’RIORDAN, RAY KEMP & MICHAEL PURDUE, SIZEWELL B: AN
ANATOMY OF INQUIRY 84 (1988).
102. Cf. Antonio Cassese & Andrew Clapham, International Law, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD 408, 409 (Joel Krieger ed., 2d ed. 2001).
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opportunity to contest the findings against them.103 An international attribution mechanism could, should it offer features along these lines, help satisfy
this demand.
In sum, the configuration of the international attribution mechanism
must be responsive to the goal of supporting States facing capacity issues,
those interested in collective attribution, and cyber-related sanctions regimes. We believe additional research is called for in order to enumerate and
ascertain specific “client” preferences and expectations. Key institutional design choices would emanate from such mapping of needs. These include (1)
whether the optimal composition is public, private, or hybrid in nature; (2)
the triggers to initiation of the mechanism’s investigation; (3) the extent to
which a mechanism should be tasked with responsibility beyond technical
attribution, such as attribution under the law of State responsibility; (4) the
necessary arrangements for access to forensic evidence and intelligence materials, including confidential sharing of information; (5) the opportunity of
entities to whom attribution is made to contest evidence collected against
them; and (6) whether, and if so when, attribution decisions and supporting
evidence should be made public.
VI.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

International fact-finding is a venerable institution. It offers a credible process for ascertaining facts underlying international incidents, and, sometimes,
the attribution of legal responsibility for violation of international law norms.
Fact-finding mechanisms have been utilized extensively in certain fields of
international law, particularly human rights and weapons control, to generate
accountability and deterrence. In such fields, it can play an integral role in
implementing the rule of law and developing and interpreting relevant international law norms.
We believe there is merit in the prospect of an independent international
attribution mechanism for cyber operations, one along the lines of, but not
necessarily identical to, the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat. Cyber operations
represent a field of activity plagued by normative ambiguity and limited accountability, where reliance on the victim State’s attribution capacities, or
those of other States or private cybersecurity companies, may not measure
up to the challenges. An independent attribution mechanism could lead to
103. Cf. Combined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n,
¶ 352, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351.
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attribution determinations enjoying a higher degree of legitimacy, thereby
serving as a stabilizing force in international relations.
To date, proposals to establish an international attribution mechanism
have not acquired momentum, either because they contain features that
States find unattractive or because they were not developed to a degree that
made States comfortable. However, we believe progress remains possible by
focusing on the three logical constituencies for such a body—States with
limited technological, intelligence, and diplomatic capacity; States interested
in generating broad collective attribution of attacks perpetrated against them;
and international and regional organizations operating a cyber-related sanctions regime. Such a focus, combined with greater granularity, would significantly improve the prospects for the establishment of an international attribution mechanism and its eventual utilization by the international community.
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